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WHERE' S  THE BEEF? THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL EFFECTS OF 
NEW JERSEY' S  ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE 
Stephen B. Burbanf<©** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New Jersey's  Entire Controversy doctrine raises difficult analytical and 
policy questions , particularly as applied to the joinder of parties , when it is 
viewed from a domestic perspective. Viewed from interjurisdictional 
perspectives,  the doctrine is challenging even for one who has probed the 
dark recesses of full faith and credit and federal common law _1 It is no 
surprise, then, that a group of recent New Jersey supreme court decisions 
demonstrates some of the troubling aspects of the doctrine as domestic law.  
A case exploring its interjurisdictional effects, MortgageLinq Corp . v.  
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.,2 i s  at least as  troubling , both 
analytically and as a matter of policy. 
I propose to reexamine the interjurisdictional issues that were the subject 
of the New Jersey supreme court's decision in MortgageLinq. I will also 
consider other situations in which this creature of domestic law may be 
translated onto the national scene. 
© Stephen B. Burbank 1 9%. 
** David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice,  University of 
Pennsylvania. I have profited from the comments and suggestiops of participants in  the 
Symposium, including, in particular, Geoffrey Hazard and Linda Silberman, of faculty 
workshop participants at the Roger Williams University School of Law, and, as always, of 
Leo Levin.  
1 .  See Stephen B. B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 7 1  CoRNELL L. REv. 733 ( 1 986) [hereinafter 
B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion]; Stephen B .  Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: 
Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEXAS L.  REv. 155 1 ( 1 992) [hereinafter 
B urbank, Sources].  
2 .  142 N .J .  336, 662 A .2d 536 ( 1 995).  The plaintiff corporation's name is variously 
spelled "MortgageLinq" and "Mortgagelinq" in state court and federal court opinions. 
"MortgageLinq" is correct. 
The other cases,  decided the same day, are: Mystic Isle Dev .  Corp. v. Perskie & 
Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A .2d 523 ( 1 995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v .  Giordano, Halleran & 
Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280,662 A.2d 509 ( 1 995);  and DiTrolio v .  Antiles , 142 N .J. 253 ,  662 A .2d 
494 ( 1 995) .  
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The New Jersey Supreme Court ignored distinctions that may be 
important to a clear and correct analysis ,  including the court whose judicial 
proceedings were in question as F l  (state or federal?) and the status of those 
proceedings at the time the New Jersey trial court ruled as F2 (judgment or 
no judgment?). I proceed by treating such distinctions as i mportant for 
analysis of New Jersey's obligations under federal law.  
I conclude that, on the assumptions that Fl  was a state court that had 
entered judgment prior to a ruling in F2, the MortgageLinq decision violated 
those obligations in two ways. First, as F2, New Jersey failed to give full 
faith and credit to the judicial proceedings in  F l .  This conclusion depends 
on findings that as a matter of language, purpose and precedent, the full faith 
and credit statute forbids giving greater, as it obviously forbids giving less , 
preclusive effect to F l  's judicial proceedings than would be given in  F l  _3 
Second, in attempting to avoid violating its federal obligations as F2, 
New Jersey violated them in a different way (and prospectively as F l )  by 
purporting to control a matter-the interjurisdictional effects of its own 
proceedings -contrary to federal law. Because the court was so intent on 
preserving power to deal as it wished with the problem before it, in the face 
of federal law, it attempted to surrender power that is conferred by federal 
law.4 
I also conclude that it makes no difference for these purposes whether F l  
was a state or federal court, or i f  i t  was a federal court, whether its judicial 
proceedings involved the adjudication of a federal question or a state law 
question in diversity. Understanding that conclusion, however, requires a 
sensitive appreciation of the interplay between federal common law and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 
Finally, I conclude that one seemingly critical distinction ignored by the 
Court in MortgageLinq-between a case in which the rendering court (F l )  
has entered a judgment and a case i n  which it has not-may not, in fact, 
make a difference to the proper result in such a case. If so, this is a situation 
where , contrary to the conventional wisdom, a judgment in F l  is not 
necessary to the existence of a federal full faith and credit obligation in F2.6 
3. See 28 U.S . C. § 1738 (1996),  quoted, infra note 18; infra text accompanying notes 
17-75 . 
4 .  See infra text accompanying notes 76-95. 
5 .  See infra text accompanying notes 96-115. 
6.  See infra text accompanying notes 116-4 7 .  For the sake of  completeness, the 
article also deals ,  in section I V, with situations in which New Jersey is Fl. See infra text 
accompanying notes 148-68. 
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II . THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S DECISION 
MortgageLinq was an action brought in New Jersey state court by 
MortgageLinq, a New Jersey/Pennsylvania-based mortgage lender, and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), assignee of 
mortgage loans made by MortgageLinq. They sued New Jersey-based 
companies and individuals (the "New Jersey defendants") that were 
allegedly involved as accessories in a fraudulent scheme involving mortgage 
financing on twenty-four properties. All but one of these properties was 
located in Atlantic County, New Jersey. 
Almost a year earlier, MortgageLinq had brought another action in  
federal court in Pennsylvania, against Pennsylvania-based companies and 
individuals who were alleged to be the central figures in  the scheme.7 
Freddie Mac had intervened as a plaintiff in  the federal action. The two cases 
involved the same twenty-four mortgage transactions and the same scheme.8 
Three of the New Jersey defendants moved to dismiss the state case as 
barred by the Entire Controversy doctrine.9 The trial court granted the 
motions and dismissed the complaints against those defendants with 
prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs were aware of the New Jersey 
defendants at the time they filed the Pennsylvania federal case , that the New 
7. ·The Pennsylvania defendants would purchase property from its owner for a 
purchase price near its fair market value (the A transaction) . The property was 
fraudulently resold on the same day to another Pennsylvania defendant (the B 
transaction) at a price substantially higher than the purchase price of the A 
transaction . . . .  In each instance, Mortgagelinq . . .  provided mortgage financing 
based on the inflated purchase price in the B transaction . Mortgagelinq sold some 
of the mortgages to Freddie Mac . . . .  Plaintiffs allege that the title companies who 
closed title in those transactions must have been aware of the fraud . . . .  
MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 339-40 ,  662 A .2d at 538.  
8 .  After the New Jersey state case had been filed, two of the defendants in the 
Pennsylvania federal case sought to force the joinder of the New Jersey defendants , either 
as additional defendants or as th ird party defendants . MortgageLinq and Freddie Mac 
opposed the motion , and the federal court denied it .  
The history of the litigation in state and federal courts is sketched in the New Jersey 
supreme court' s  opinion . See MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 340-42 , 662 A .2d at 538-39. A 
more complete account of the federal cases,  upon which my summary also draws, is found 
in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.  Co. ,  1 993 U.S .  
Dist. LEXIS 405 1 (E.D. Pa .  1 993) . 
9. The Pennsylvania federal action was pending-no judgment had been entered- at 
the time the motions were filed in the New Jersey state case and when the trial court in New 
Jersey ruled on those motions .  See MortgageLinq v. Commonwealth Land Title, 262 N .J. 
Super. 1 7 8 ,  182 , 620 A .2d 456 , 457 (Law Div. 1 992) , aff'd, 275 N.J. Super. 79, 645 A .2d 
787 (App. Div. 1 994) , aff'd in part and rev'd in part , 142 N.J. 336 ,662 A .2d 5 36 ( 1 995) .  
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Jersey defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, and 
that the subject matter of the two suits was identical . The court held that "the 
entire controversy doctrine operates to bar suits against parties which could 
and should have been joined in a previous suit despite the fact that the earlier 
suit was brought in another state or federal court.''lO 
Prior to taking an appeal in their New Jersey state case , 1 1  MortgageLinq 
and Freddie Mac made their adversaries in that proceeding defendants in 
another federal case in Pennsylvania. l 2 Some of the defendants moved to 
have the case dismissed as precluded by full  faith and credit to the New 
Jersey orders of dismissal . The federal court denied these motions on the 
ground that the New Jersey judgment was not final .l3 The court observed, 
however, that once final, the New Jersey judgment would be preclusive in 
federal court.14 
After the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's decision 
dismissing the complaint in the New Jersey case, the supreme court granted 
the plaintiffs' petition for certification. The court discerned two questions of 
interjurisdictional import: "The issue is whether the non-joinder of parties in 
a related action in the Pennsylvania federal court results in the same party 
preclusion in New Jersey [as would occur if the two cases had been brought 
successively in New Jersey courts] . If so, what is the effect of that preclusion 
in other jurisdictions?"1 5  
The court held that the plaintiffs were precluded from suing in New 
Jersey the defendants who had been omitted from the federal case in 
Pennsylvania, even though they would not have been precluded from suing 
them in federal court. The court also held, that this result was binding only 
10. MortgageLinq, 262 N.J. Super. at 1 90, 620 A.2d at 461 .  
1 1 .  The Entire Controversy dismissals applied to three defendants , leaving a pending 
case in the trial court against four defendants . As a result,  the plaintiffs could not take an 
immediate appeal , and the dismissals were held not final for purposes of preclusion . See 
infra text accompanying note 1 3 .  
1 2 .  According to the New Jersey supreme court , b y  the time the plaintiffs filed the 
second federal case in September 1 992, the initial case "had . . .  been concluded by 
settlements or default  judgments against most of the named defendants." MartgageLinq, 
142 N.J. at 342 n .2 ,  662 A.2d at 539 n .2 .  However, judgment was not entered against 
thirteen of the defendants until July 2 1 , 1 993 . See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v .  
Commonwealth Land Title Ins.  Co. ,  1 993 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 405 1 ,  at *5 (E .D.  Pa.  1 993) . 
13. Id. at *35-36. 
14.  Id. 
1 5 .  MortgageLinq, 142 N.J .  a( 343, 662 A .2d at 540. 
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i n  New Jersey, leaving other jurisdictions free to permit litigation against the 
omitted defendants in their courts. 16 
With respect, the court's affirmative answer to the first question is 
wrong, and, although its answer to the second question was intended to save 
the day, that answer is impermissible. 
Ill. NEW JERSEY As THE SECOND FORUM (F2) 
A. Some Simplifying Assumptions 
The first question identified by the New Jersey supreme court in 
MortgageLinq has to do with that state ' s  freedom to treat the judicial 
proceedings of another jurisdiction as if they were New Jersey domestic 
proceedings for purposes of applying the Entire Controversy doctrine . It will 
advance the analysis of the problem to make two counterfactual 
assumptions . First, let us assume that the related action was filed in the 
courts of another state (rather than in federal court) -that, i n  other words, Fl  
was a state court. Second, let us  assume that Fl  entered judgment prior to a 
ruling on the Entire Controversy issue in F2. The purpose of both 
assumptions is to remove potential obstacles to consideration of New 
Jersey's obligations under the full  faith and credit clause of the 
Constitution1 7  and its implementing statute.l8 Once those basic issues have 
been explored, it will be time to return to the even more exotic problems 
suggested by the facts of MortgageLinq. 
16.  !d. at 347, 662 A .2d at 542 . 
1 7 .  "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts , Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State . And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts , Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the 
Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 .  
1 8 .  The Acts of the legislature of any State , Territory , or Possession of the United 
States , or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, 
Territory or Possession thereto. 
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, territory or 
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and 
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists , together with a certificate of a judge of 
the court that the said attestation is in proper form. 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and 
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken . 
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1996) (emphasis added) . 
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To say that the stated assumptions remove some of the potential 
obstacles to full faith and credit analysis is not to say that the court in 
MortgageLinq deemed the matters they addressed important, or that the 
assumptions remove all such obstacles. Indeed, the court in MortgageLinq 
(1) relied indiscriminately on lower court decisions that involved prior 
proceedings in state and federal courts and that ignored interjurisdictional 
complications,19 (2) barely mentioned full faith and credit,20 (3) disparaged 
the precedential value of the only cited lower court decision that did consider 
interjurisdictional complications,21 and (4) failed even to note the stage of 
the proceedings in Fl when the court in F2 (New Jersey) ruled.22 
If the question had been whether plaintiffs were precluded from suing, in 
F2, persons who had not been joined as defendants in a case that had gone to 
judgment in a court of another state (Fl) where they would not be precluded, 
it is hard to see how the federal question of full faith and credit could have 
been avoided. 
Both the constitutional provision and the statute require that full faith 
and credit be given to the "judicial proceedings" of other states.23 Although 
it is a mistake to regard a court judgment as a synonym for "judicial 
proceedings," rather than as a product of such proceedings,24 full faith and 
19. See Gross v. Cohen DuFour & Assocs., 273 N.J. Super. 617, 642 A.2d 1074 (Law 
Div. 1993) (related New Jersey federal litigation); Giudice v. Drew Chern. Corp., 210 N.J. 
Super. 32, 509 A.2d 200 (App. Div. 1986), certif. granted and summarily remanded on 
other g rounds, 104 N.J. 465, 564, 517 A.2d 448, 449 (1986) (related New York state 
litigation). Apart from the failure of either decision to consider possible interjurisdictional 
complications, the lower court in Gross relied on the lower court opinion in MortgageLinq . 
See Gross, 273 N.J. Super. at 625-26.642 A.2d at 1079-80. 
Elsewhere in its opinion in MortgageLinq, the New Jersey Supreme Court observed 
that "[b]ecause the federal courts are considered those of another sovereign ... [federal­
state] cases will also serve to guide us in cases involving proceedings in other states." 
MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 346,662 A.2d at 541. 
20. "Maintaining a cohesive federal system (and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
melds state courts into that system) does not require that the other parts of the federal 
system honor our entire controversy doctrine." !d. at 348, 662 A.2d at 542. 
21. See Kimmins Abatement Corp. v. Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs .. Inc., 253 N.J. 
Super. 162,601 A.2d 256 (Law Div. 1991). The MortgageLinq court distinguished Kimmins 
Abatement .  MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 344, 662 A.2d at 540. 
22. In his dissent. Justice Pollock asserted that "the majority extends unduly New 
Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to detennine the preclusive effect of a judgment 
rendered by a federal court in another state." !d. at 348-49, 662 A.2d at 542 (Pollock, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). But see supra note 9. 
23. See supra notes 17 & 18. 
24. See infra text accompanying note 121. 
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credit to court judgments was the central concern of the framers of the 
Constitution and of the members of the first Congress .25 
In exercising its power to prescribe the effect to be given to state 
"judicial proceedings," Congress has always chosen to tie the measure of 
respect required of other courts , state and federal , to the measure of respect 
such proceedings have, "by law or usage," in the courts of the state from 
which they are taken.26 Indeed, since 1948 the statute has described the 
obligation as giving "the same full faith and credit."27 
B. Non-Obvious Avoidance Techniques 
1. Labels and Static Conformity 
It might be possible to avoid Congress ' directive if the obligation it 
imposed were cabined in a way that is not obvious from the text. There are, 
after all ,  unstated exceptions to the statute's literal command.28 Thus, if the 
obligation were limited to the requirements of preclusion law, framed as 
such, or of preclusion law as it existed in the late eighteenth century, it 
might not reach something called the "Entire Controversy doctrine," at least 
when used to enforce notions of mandatory party joinder that are 
idiosyncratic today and that were unknown and probably unthinkable in 
1790 .29 
It would be silly-an invitation to evasion-to permit the content of the 
federal obligation to turn on state law labels.  Following in this respect the 
25 . See, e .g . ,  D 'Arcy v .  Ketchum, 52 U.S.  ( 1 1 How.) 165 ,  1 75-76 ( 1 850); M 'Elmoyle 
v. Cohen, 38 U.S.  ( 1 3  Pet.) 3 1 2 ,  324-26 ( 1 839); Kurt H .  Nadelmann ,  Full Faith and Credit 
to Judgments: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33 ( 1957) .  
26.  The implementing statute enacted by the First Congress provided: 
[The duly authenticated] records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any 
state . . .  shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the 
United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the states from whence 
the said records are or shall be taken .  
Act o f  M a y  26, 1 790, c h .  1 1 ,  1 Stat. 1 22 .  
27 .  See supra note 18 .  For a discussion o f  the significance to be accorded changes 
made in 1948, when Congress revised the Judicial Code , see Nadelmann ,  supra note 25 , at 
8 1 -86. 
28. "Exceptions there are , but they are few and affect only a small number of 
judgments , and no tendency to enlarge them appears ." Robert H .  Jackson ,  Full Faith and 
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution , 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 ,  10 ( 1 945). See 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v .  Hunt, 320 U.S.  430 , 438 ( 1943). 
29. This discussion covers both situations in which a New Jersey state court is F2 and 
situations in which it is Fl. 
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unambiguous tenor of the statutory l anguage, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has recently made it clear that labels are not determinative 
when considering the domestic law of F1.30 
It would make even less sense to let the federal obligation tum on a l abel 
used in the domestic law of F2. Thus, historically and functionally,  the 
application of the Entire Controversy doctrine to parties has been linked to 
its application to claims,3 1  and both applications have been treated ,  by New 
Jersey and federal courts alike, as a species of preclusion doctrine .32 
Full faith and credit would poorly serve its intended function as a 
"nationally unifying force,"33 and would be inadequate for contemporary 
needs, if the statutory obligation of conformity to the law applied in F l  were 
static-that is,  limited to the law as it existed in 1790 or, for that matter, 
1948. Again, the Supreme Court's decisions suggest no such limitation. 
30 .  "We note . . .  that if a State chooses to approach the preclusive effect of a 
judgment embodying the terms of a settlement agreement as a question of pure contract 
law , a federal court must adhere to that approach under § 1 738 ." Matsushita Elec . I ndus . 
Co . ,  Ltd . ,  v. Epstein , 1 1 6 S .  Ct. 873 , 880 n .6 ( 1996) (citation omitted) . 
"Without [an] implicit principle of functional equivalence full faith and credit would 
be a far weaker instrument than it is and would be of little help in integrating the legal 
systems of the states." A. VoN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE 
PROBLEMS 1460 ( 1 965) .  
3 1 .  Indeed, Rule 4:30A , which became effective in 1990, provides ,  i n  pertinent part , 
that "[n]on-joinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire controversy 
doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the 
entire controversy doctrine . . . .  " N.J. CT. R. 4 : 30A (emphasis added) . "The purposes that 
have stimulated the growth of the claims-joinder rule, which has historically been equated 
with the entire controversy doctrine, are similar, if not identical , to those of the party­
joinder rule." Cogdell v .  Hospital Ctr. at Orange , 1 16 N.J. 7, 2 1 ,  560 A .2d 1 169, 1 175 
( 1 989) . " [The] commonality of purposes . . .  indicates that they are conceptual subsets of 
the entire controversy doctrine ." /d. at 20, 560 A.2d at 1 1 75 . 
32. "Although party preclusion is not an exact fit for application of principles of res 
judicata (usually the parties must be the same for res judicata to apply) , the concepts are 
similar." MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 346 n .3 ,  662 A .2d at 541 n .3 .  "New Jerse y ' s  entire 
controversy doctrine is inextricably related to the general principles of res j udicata." 
Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co. ,  Inc . ,  889 F.2d 4 1 , 43-44 n .5 (3d Cir. 1 989) . See 
also Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 1 80, 1 87 , 678 A .2d 243 ,  246 ( 1 996) ("stems directly from 
the principles underlying the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion").  
33 .  Magnolia Petroleum Co. v .  Hunt , 320 U.S.  430, 439 ( 1 943) . 
The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the 
several states as independent foreign sovereignties , each free to ignore obligations 
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others , and to m ake 
them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just 
obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origi n .  
Milwaukee County v .  M . E .  White Co., 2 96  U.S . 268 , 276-77 (1935) .  
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Indeed, the 1980 case in which the Court rediscovered the statute presented a 
problem of non-mutual issue preclusion, a distinctly modem development.34 
The Court's most recent full faith and credit decision involved the preclusive 
effect of a state court judgment approving the settlement of a class action on 
claims within exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction.35 That is a 
scenario as far removed from 1790 as is the composition of this article on a 
computer. 
2. "Core" Rules and Policies 
Another rationale for avoiding full faith and credit should be considered. 
It may be related to the last but is more sophisticated. Professor Cooper, an 
acute student of and commentator on the domestic and interjurisdictional law 
of preclusion, has suggested that the federal obligation should be confined to 
the "central core" of preclusion doctrine.36 He proposes leaving state (and 
federal) courts in the position of F2 free to ignore aspects of preclusion 
doctrine followed by F1 that implicate neither the "core values of finality, 
repose, and reliance;•37 nor the power of F1 to control its own procedures . 
For example, if F1 would permit nonmutual issue preclusion, Professor 
Cooper would not require F2 to do the same. 
The major values served by nonmutual preclusion lie in the public costs of 
relitigation and the fear of inconsistency. A later court should be free to 
assume the costs of relitigation. And a first  court should not be able to 
inflict on others its timorous fears of being proved wrong.38 
Although intriguing and advanced with the author's customary refined 
judgment, the notion that there should be an exception to full faith and credit 
for some matters of preclusion deemed outside the "core" is problematic. It 
is not enough to observe that the proposal finds no explicit support in the 
full faith and credit statute or in Supreme Court decisions interpreting it. 
For, there are unstated exceptions, albeit very few now, to the l iteral 
command, and Professor Cooper invokes the "sorry history of workers' 
34. See Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90 (1980). For the "rediscovery" of the ful l  faith 
and credit statute , see Burbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1, at 8 01. 
35 . See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,  Ltd. v. Epstein , 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996). 
36. 18 CHARLES A. WRJGHT ET AL . ,  FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4467, at 625 
( 1981) [hereinafter E. CoOPER] . 
37 .  /d. at 636. 
38 .  /d. § 4465 , at 617 (footnote omitted); see id. § 4467, at 642-43. 
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compensation cases" as "slight Supreme Court support for the proposition 
that a later state can narrow the preclusion rules that a prior state would 
apply to its own judgment."39 
It also may be "not convincing" to argue "that full faith and credit 
demands a simple,  clear, and unwavering standard, that if any departure is  
permitted from the law of the judgment court other states will substitute their 
own rules so often as to weaken the core of full faith and credit."40 These are 
not, however, the only reasons to reject the proposal . 
Professor Cooper makes judgments about the status of preclusion rules 
on the basis of a consideration of policies-finality, repose, and reliance-he 
deems central to the body of doctrine as a whole. Obviously,  however, there 
is room for disagreement about both the most important preclusion policies 
and the most important rules, particularly over time. As an example of the 
difficulty of drawing lines (or circles), whatever one thinks of Professor 
Cooper's dispatch of the preclusion policy of "protect[ing] overworked 
courts ," 4 1  his treatment of the policy is very much the work of an academic 
and, as he himself seems to recognize, very much out of step with 
contemporary judicial attitudes.42 
. 
Moreover, Professor Cooper sometimes seems to regard the policies 
animating domestic preclusion law as fungible with, and exhausting, the 
interjurisdictional policies animating full faith and credit.43 Yet, the full  
faith and credit obligation is not limited to "judicial proceedings ," let alone 
to judgments.44 Moreover, a broader policy underlying the obligation that 
has not changed over time and that is independent of any discrete preclusion 
value is the policy of unifying or integrating the several states .45 "It serves 
39. /d. § 4467 , at 638 . 
40. /d. at 648. 
41 . !d.§ 4403, at 14 .  
42 . See id.; id. at  2 1 .  "Economy of the time of the courts i s  one of the obvious 
beneficial results of the doctrine , and this feature becomes increasingly important as work 
crowds more and more on our overburdened tribunals . . . .  " Robert von Moschzisker, Res 
Judicata , 38 YALELJ. 299, 300 (1929) (emphasis added) (yes, 1929!) . 
43.  Thus , he refers interchangeably to the "core of full faith and credit," E .  COOPER, 
supra note 36, § 4467 , at 628, and the "core of res judicata." /d. at 630. 
For discussion of a similar phenomenon in connection with the recognition of 
internationally foreign judgments, see Burbank , Sources, supra note 1 ,  at 1582-87 . 
44 . See supra notes 1 7  & 1 8; supra text accompanying note 24. 
45 . See supra note 33 and accompanying text; A .  VoN MEHREN & D .  TRAliTMAN, 
supra note 30, at 1458-66. Although observing that "[o]ne purpose of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause is to bring an end to litigation," Justice White confirmed that " [p]erhaps [its] 
major purpose . . .  is  to act as a nationally unifying force." Thomas v. Washington Gas 
Light Co .,  448 U.S.  261 , 288-89 ( 1980) (White, J., concurring) .  
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to coordinate the administration of justice among the several independent 
legal systems which exist in our Federation."46 Presumably, it is the latter 
policy that leads Professor Cooper to acknowledge the wisdom of requiring 
F2 to follow Fl  's preclusion rules that, although not part of the "core," 
nevertheless implicate Fl  's power to control its own procedures.47 He 
should not stop there. 
Consider again the example of nonmutual issue preclusion used by 
Professor Cooper as one illustration of rules far from the core that F2 should 
not be required to follow. Fl permits nonmutual issue preclusion; according 
to Professor Cooper, F2 should be "free to assume the costs of 
relitigation."48 He reaches that conclusion by discounting for full faith and 
credit purposes the policy of reducing "the public costs of l itigation," and by 
disparaging the "fear of inconsistency .''49 He also fails to consider the 
interjurisdictional implications of the fact that, as he recognizes in the 
domestic context, "once the rules of nonmutual preclusion are established 
they may generate substantial consequences of repose."50 
Preclusion policies aside , Professor Cooper does not attempt to reconcile 
his view that F2 should be permitted to relitigate with the federal full faith 
and credit policy of unifying the several states. The abolition of mutuality 
encourages attempts to settle legal issues affecting many persons in one 
proceeding .5 1  Having incurred substantial costs incident to such an attempt, 
Fl is not likely to be mollified by the argument that F2 wil l  bear the costs of 
relitigation,52 or to agree with the notion that the policy stakes are limited to 
its "timorous fears of being proved wrong."53 
Finally, even if the Supreme Court of the United States adopted 
Professor Cooper's proposal to limit F2's full faith and credit obligation, the 
exception or exemption seemingly would not apply here. Granted that New 
46. Jackson , supra note 28, at 2 .  See id. at 2 1 -34 ("Legislative Power Better to 
Integrate Our Legal Systems") . 
47. See E. CoOPER, supra note 36, § 4467 , at 625 , 636, 644. Cf. id. at 647-48 (greater 
preclusive effect) . 
48 .  See supra text accompanying note 38 .  
49. See E .  CoOPER, supra note 36, § 4465 , at 617 .  
50. /d. § 4403, at 16. "Not only may nonparties breathe freer, they may direct their 
future conduct according to the results of an adjudication between strangers ." /d. at 16- 1 7 .  
5 1 .  See , e .g . ,  Friends for All Children, Inc. v .  Lockheed Aircraft Corp . ,  497 F .  Supp. 
3 1 3  (D.D.C. 1980) , rev'd, 658 F.2d 835 (D. C. Cir. 198 1 ) ,  cert. denied, 455 U.S.  994 ( 1982). 
52. Cf. Thomas v .  Washington Gas Light Co. ,  448 U.S. 261 ,  293 ( 1980) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) ("Otherwise . . .  Virgin ia's efforts and expense on an applicant's behalf are 
wasted when that applicant obtains a duplicative remedy in another State .") .  
53 . See supra text accompanying note 38 .  
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Jersey's broad mandatory party joinder scheme is unusual , if not unique, and 
might not be thought part of the core,54 the referent for the full faith and 
credit obligation is the law applied in Fl . In MortgageLinq and my 
hypothetical variant involving a state court judgment, the l aw of F l  is the 
traditional rule of no preclusion with respect to persons not made parties . 
Tradition may not be determinative of status for these purposes. Yet, 
consideration of Professor Cooper's proposal reminds us that the effect of 
applying the Entire Controversy doctrine to parties is to preclude claims _55 
In any event, as we shall see, adherence to Fl  's rules may be necessary to 
preserve its power to control its own procedures. 
With these possible avoidance techniques out of the way, we may now 
tum to two more formidable arguments that might save New Jersey from 
violation of federal law. 
C. Greater Preclusive Effect 
The paradigmatic full faith and credit violation occurs when a state gives 
less preclusive effect to the judicial proceedings of another state than they 
would be given in the courts of the state from which they are taken. 
Historically, the concern was that some states were either ignoring, or 
allowing the ready impeachment of, money judgments secured in other 
states.56 For an example that captures modem developments i n  preclusion 
law, assume that F2 's domestic preclusion law still permits a person injured 
in an automobile accident to sue the same defendant separately for damages 
to the person and damages to property, while F l  follows the modem 
approach and does not permit such splitting .57 F2 would violate the full faith 
and credit statute if it permitted a suit for property damage against the same 
defendant whom the plaintiff had previously sued for personal injuries in F l .  
My hypothetical variant of MortgageLinq is different i n  that, i f  New 
Jersey were permitted to apply its domestic law-the Entire Controversy 
doctrine-the result would not be less preclusive effect but greater 
54. But see E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 4467 , at 641 ("procedural desire to frame 
comprehensive litigation in the initial forum . . .  deserves full faith and credit support"); id. 
at 643 (arguing for obligation to respect compulsory counterclaim rule of another state 
"since the purpose of such rules is not only procedural convenience for the first court but 
also to gain the repose values inherent in settling all related accounts between the parties") . 
55 . See supra note 3 1 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., Nadelmann ,  supra note 25 . 
57.  See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§§ 24-25 (1982). 
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preclusive effect. The plaintiff would be precluded from suing in F2 parties 
he could sue in Fl .  
If  the only policies underlying full faith and credit were the policies of 
domestic preclusion law, it would be difficult to locate the harm, and hence 
difficult to conclude that there had been a violation of federal law, i n  this 
situation.58  Some scholars have been down this road, reasoning that there is 
no federal barrier to greater preclusive effect.59 In my view, however, the 
arguments are ultimately unpersuasive whether the rule of greater preclusive 
effect they support is broad or narrow in scope.60 
The First Congress chose to give content to the constitutional obligation 
not by requiring F2 to apply the law that would be applied in F2,6 1  but by 
requiring F2 to apply the law that would be applied in F l .62 Disregarding 
implications of the statutory command to give the "same full faith and 
5 8. "After all, if the recognizing jurisdiction's law calls for preclusion, the shared 
goal of putting an end to litigation will be served, and the rendering jurisdiction will have 
no complaint." B urbank, Sources, supra note 1 ,  at 1585 (footnote omitted) . 
59. See, e .g . ,  Eugene F. Scoles,  Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 742, 749-53 (1979); David P .  Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 3 1 7 ,  326-27 ( 1978) .  Professor Currie also considers counter-arguments . 
60. Professor Cooper, whose discussion of this problem is linked to his discussion of 
"core" rules and policies , would permit some scope for greater effect, depending upon the 
precise question. See E. CcxwER, supra note 36, § 4467 , at 644-48. Professor Cooper has 
since acknowledged that "[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the effect of state 
court judgments in federal litigation strongly suggest that the full faith and credit statute 
forbids a second court from giving greater preclusive effect than would be given by the 
court that rendered the judgment." /d. at § 4467, at 454 (Supp. 1996) .  
6 1 . "Without more, i t  would be reasonable to argue that all o f  the nationalizing 
purposes of full faith and credit could be served by requiring a second state to honor 
judgments from other states by direct enforcement and by affording the same res judicata 
protections as arise from its own judgments ." /d. at § 4467, at 637 . 
62. For analysis and discussion of the theoretical and practical differences between 
this formulation and the erroneous interpretation of the statute in recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court, whereby F2 is directed to apply the domestic preclusion law of F l , see 
B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1 ,  at 797-829; Burbank, Sources , supra 
note 1 ,  at 1 556-7 1 .  
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credit" in F2 as would be given in F 1  ,63 there has never been any basis in 
the statute's language for construing the obligation as a one way street.64 
Numerous Supreme Court opinions, both old and new, i n  dictum and 
holding, oppose the notion that F2 is free to give greater preclusive effect.65 
Included among the more recent statements to that effect is a concurring 
opinion by Justice White expressing the wish that it were possible to give 
greater precl usive effect, but the conviction that it was foreclosed by the 
"long standing" "contrary construction of§ 1738.'>66 
The Court's construction is supported by considerations relating to the 
statute's integrative role.67 Party joinder rules reflect adjustments among 
policies that may be in tension, if not in conflict. They are policies that relate 
to efficient adjudication, fairness , and party autonomy .68 The rule on 
necessary and indispensable parties, in particular, 
is administered against the background of an often unstated but very 
important premise: Persons suffering similar injuries ordinarily do not have 
to j oin in seeking to redress their injuries through litigation, and an inj u red 
person is ordinarily not required to bring suit against all who might be 
liable for the injury. The "plaintiff autonomy" premise is the point of 
departure for the necessary parties rule.69 
Whatever policies animate them, party joinder rules are considered and 
relied on by prospective plaintiffs before commencing litigation, and by 
those who have been made parties when considering subsequent moves. 
When making these calculations , parties advised by competent attorneys 
63 . The implications should be disregarded because the changes made to yield this 
language in 1948 were called "[c]hanges . . .  in  phraseology." H.R. REP. No. 80-308 ( 1 st 
Sess . )  at A 1 50 ( 1 947).  Moreover, "(t]he addition of ' full ' can narrow down the command. 
To the extent that the Full Faith and Credit clause is self-executing, any such narrowing 
down would have to be discarded as in contravention of the command by the Constitution." 
Nadelman n ,  supra note 25 , at 83. 
64. See supra note 26. 
65 . See ,  e.g . ,  Marrese v . American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 
( 1 985);  Union & Planters ' Bank v .  Memphis, 1 89 U.S. 7 1  ( 1 903); B urbank, 
lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 803-04. 
66 . Migra v .  Warren City Sch . Dist. Bd. of Educ. ,  465 U.S. 75 , 88 ( 1 984) (White, J., 
concurring) . 
67 . See supra text accompanying note 45. 
68 . See f'LEMING JAMEs, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE ch . 10 (4th ed. 1 992) 
[hereinafter F.  JAMES ET AL.]. 
69. /d. § 10. 1 2 ,  at 528 (footnote omitted) . 
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consider the preclusive consequences that party joinder decisions may entail , 
just as they consider such matters in connection with decisions about the 
joinder of claims . Thus ,  tying the federal obligation to the preclusive effects 
in F l  is essential from the point of view of predictability. "From the 
perspective of litigants . . .  a system of preclusion rules . . .  keyed to the 
locus of subsequent litigation would be hopeless , either because it would be 
unpredictable or because it  would be ,  functionally, a sham.'•70 
To permit New Jersey, as F2, to preclude where F l  would not do so 
might advance the preclusion policies of New Jersey. It could hardly be 
thought, however, to further the goal of unifying the several states. The 
concern is  not so much, and certainly not only, possible offense to F l  from 
New Jersey's failure to adhere to Fl 's solution. When F2 gives greater 
preclusive effect, it may impose concrete costs on Fl .7 1  
By precluding a plaintiff from suing defendants that had been omitted 
from a prior lawsuit in Fl , which permitted but did not require their joinder 
and would not bar a second lawsuit, New Jersey as F2 could effectively 
deprive F l  of the ability to control its own procedures. Such a regime could 
shape future behavior72 by making the party joinder rules of New Jersey the 
basis for litigation strategy decisions in Fl . The risk would be greatest with 
respect to those for whom F2 was , or was feared to be ,  the only other 
available,  or practical , venue and for whom the disadvantages of two suits 
(as opposed to one) in Fl exceeded the advantages_73 
70. B urbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1 ,  at 797 (footnote omitted). 
Does not, however, the issue become whether the purposes underlying full faith and 
credit are exhausted in accommodation of potentially conflicting policies of the 
s ister states concerned or whether these purposes ,  even in the absence of actual or 
potential conflict ,  call for solutions that facilitate multistate activity and minimize 
the dislocations arising from the existence of state boundaries? 
A .  VoN MEHREN & D. TRAlJIMAN, supra note 30, at 1 459. 
7 1 .  "A rule of greater preclusive effects , once known , could have a consequential 
impact on the conduct of the initial litigation , as risk-averse parties treat what should have 
been a local skirmish as if i t  were a world war. This escalation would impose unwanted 
costs on [F1] ." B urbank,  Sources, supra note 1 ,  at 1 585 . See also Graham C. Lilly ,  T11e 
Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 3 1 2  ( 1 993) . 
72. "To determine whether a rule is beneficial ,  a court must examine how that rule 
influences future behavior." Premier E!ec. Constr. Co. v. National E!ec. Contractors Ass ' n ,  
Inc . ,  8 14 F .2d 358, 366 (7th Cir. 1987).  
7 3 .  Considering the implications of applying New Jersey 's  Entire Controversy 
doctrine to determine the preclusive effects of a sister-state judgment, the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit observed: 
We note at least the theoretical possibility that such a holding might compel careful 
l i tigators in other jurisdictions to raise all related claims and issues and seek all 
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It might be argued that there is no imposition on F l  or sacrifice of its 
policy preferences -that, more colloquially, F l  should not care - because its 
own rules contemplate that a related lawsuit can be brought there . I do not 
fi nd the argument persuasive. First, as just suggested, a litigant for whom 
two suits, one in F l  and the other elsewhere, would be preferable to one i n  
F l  may nonetheless prefer one suit i f  the only alternative is  two i n  F l .  If so, 
Fl 's  preference for party autonomy74 would be sacrificed. Second, F l  may 
take the view that in such matters litigant preferences are also the best 
measure of efficiencyJ5 If so, F l  's view of efficient adjudication would be 
sacrificed. Third, and more controversially, F l  's rules on this subject may 
reflect the expectation that, at least in some instances, Fl  will not have to 
bear all of the costs of dispute resolution that could result from leaving wide 
scope to party autonomy, because parties will choose to pursue additional 
litigation in other jurisdictions. If so, F l  's expectations would be frustrated. 
D. Preclusion in New Jersey "Without Prejudice "  
If New Jersey i s  not normally free to give greater preclusive effect, the 
only remaining avoidance technique is  one that has also been suggested by 
Professor Cooper, whereby F2 bars litigation in its own courts but without 
prejudice to litigation elsewhereJ6 
There would be little profit in dwelling on the reasoning behind the New 
Jersey supreme court's conclusion that the trial court had erred i n  dismissing 
the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice ,  even though the Entire Controversy 
doctrine barred further litigation by the plaintiffs in New Jersey against the 
defendants omitted in their federal action in Pennsylvania. There is irony in 
the use made by the court of its prior decision in Watkins v .  Resorts 
available remedies in a single proceeding, because of the possibility that a 
subsequent claim might arise in New Jersey. In this way , New Jersey would be 
imposing on litigants and courts in other states its policy choice to encourage 
parties to litigate all claims, defenses, issues , and remedies related to a particular 
transaction . 
Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co. ,  Inc., 889 F.2d 4 1 ,  45 n .6 (3d Cir. 1 989) . 
74. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
75. See F. JAMES ET AL. ,  supra note 68, § 9.8 , at 482-83; § 10 . 1 1 ,  at 525-26. 
76.  Where F 1  retains the requirement of mutuality and the question is 
a defendant's efforts to preclude a plaintiff, the second court probably should be 
free to dismiss a second action so as to protect its own interests in avoiding 
repetitive litigation. It should not be free to enter judgment on the merits for the 
defendant so as to preclude an action in another court. 
E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 4467, at 648 .  See also Lilly , supra note 7 1 ,  at 307-08 . 
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International Hotel and Casino, Inc.17 The court borrowed some of 
Watkins' technical apparatus, but not its sensitivity to i nterjurisdictional 
obligations.78 The teleological nature of the conclusion "that a dismissal for 
failure to comply with the entire controversy doctrine is  more similar to a 
threshold adjudication than to an adjudication on the merits"79 is  plain. 
It may be that the supreme court of New Jersey responded as it did to the 
second question posed in MortgageLinq- ''what is the effect of . . . 
preclusion [in New Jersey] in other jurisdictions?"8°-precisely to avoid the 
conclusion suggested by full faith and credit analysis .  The court was seeking 
to justify the application of its own (F2) law in the face of serious 
objections .8 1  In its haste to accomplish that, the court failed to mark any 
distinction among dismissals based on the Entire Controversy doctrine. As a 
result, a dismissal for failure to join claims might be treated similarly,  and 
the same rule of non-preclusion outside of the New Jersey state courts would 
apply if New Jersey were Fl (or both Fl and F2, with the question arising in 
F3) .82 
It remains to determine whether limiting the effects of F2's  more 
broadly preclusive rule to F2 obviates any full  faith and credit problems that 
would otherwise exist. I conclude that two wrongs do not make a right. New 
77. 1 24 N.J. 398 , 591 A .2d 592 ( 1 991) .  
78 .  See MortgageLinq, 142 N .J. 336, 345-48 , 662 A .2d 536, 54 1 -42 ( 1 995).  
79.  !d. at  347 , 662 A .2d at  542 . 
80. See supra text accompanying note 15 .  
8 1 .  "Although the majority precludes plaintiffs from suing in the [New Jersey] state 
courts , it leaves them free to pursue a second action in the federal courts . To achieve this 
result, the majority characterizes a state court dismissal based on the entire-controversy 
doctrine as one without prejudice." MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 354-55 ,  662 A .2d at 545 
(Pollock, J . ,  dissenting) . 
82. See id. at 347-48,  662 A .2d at 542. The court' s  initial statement and defense of its 
holding is  limited to the "preclusive effect to our rules of party joinder." !d. at 338,  662 
A.2d at 537.  Otherwise , the only qualification noted by the court appears to be based on an 
erroneous premise. Thus, the court suggested that the question of preclusion in a diversity 
action in New Jersey federal court as F2 might be governed by "choice-of-law principles." 
!d. at 347-48 n .4 ,  662 A .2d at 542 n .4 (cross-referencing Byrd v. B lue Ridge Rural Elec.  
Coop. ,  356 U.S. 525 ( 1 958)) .  As Professor Degnan made clear, the case (assuming a 
judgment i n  the "prior state court action in New Jersey") is governed by the full faith and 
credit statute, not the jurisprudence of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins ,  304 U.S.  64 ( 1 938),  and 
its progeny. See Ronan E.  Degnan , Federalized Res Judicata , 85 YALE L.J. 74 1 ,  750-55 
( 1 976) ; B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 735 . Compare infra text 
accompanying note 165 (no judgment) . For a recent decision proceeding from the same 
erroneous premise , where the initial action was brought and went to judgment in New York 
state court, see ltzkoffv .  F & G Realty of New Jersey Corp . ,  890 F.Supp. 35 1 (D.N.J. 1 995) .  
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Jersey cannot satisfy its federal obligation as F2 by making it impossible for 
other states to satisfy theirs as F3 . Put another way, New Jersey cannot 
satisfy its federal obligation by transferring it to other jurisdictions. 
In the course of its decision in MortgageLinq, the New Jersey supreme 
court observed that "fairness to the system of judicial administration," was , 
with "fairness to the parties," "[o]ne of the underpinnings of the entire 
controversy doctrine:·83 The court went on to assert that "[e]ach jurisdiction 
is free to assess the importance of such values ."84 As a result, according to 
the court: 
If Pennsylvania courts do not have a comparable party-joinder rule,  
principles of comity suggest that New Jersey should not seek to export i ts 
entire controversy doctrine to regulate the conduct of attorneys i n  that 
juri sdiction. In other words, attorneys conducting litigation in Pennsylvania 
courts should not have to accommodate their practices to the demands of 
New Jersey courts . A coroll ary of that proposi tion, however, i s  that New 
Jersey courts need not necessari ly grant relief when parties deliberately 
refrain from seeking relief in other jurisdictions when doi ng so would have 
been much fairer to all parties i nvolved _85 
Once it had found a way to implement this view of interjurisdictional 
interests, the court sought comfort in the proposition that "[m]aintaining a 
cohesive federal system (and the Full Faith and Credit Clause melds the state 
courts into that system) does not require that the other parts of the federal 
system honor our entire controversy doctrine."86 
These are not choices for New Jersey to make. A literal approach to the 
full faith and credit statute affords no more warrant for this departure by F2 
from the preclusive effects that would be given in F l  than for the more 
drastic departure that dismissal with prejudice would portend .87 Moreover, 
eminent scholars long ago identified the failure to grasp that full  faith and 
credit is a national policy as a major vice of the Supreme Court's  decision in 
83.  MortgageLinq, 142 N.J .  at  344 , 662 A .2d at 540. 
84 . !d. at 345 , 662 A .2d at 540. 
85 . /d. ,  662 A .2d at 541 (emphasis added) . 
86. !d. at 348 , 662 A.2d at 542 . 
87 . See supra note 1 8 .  Note that the regime favored by Justice White , but which he 
concluded was foreclosed by precedent,  see supra text accompanying note 66, would have 
permitted federal courts to apply their own , more broadly preclusive rules, "the p arties then 
being free to relitigate in the state courts ." Migra v .  Warren City Sch . Dist .  Bd.  of Educ . ,  
465 U . S .  75 , 88  ( 1984) (White , J . ,  concurring). 
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Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v .  McCartin.88 The result is that a state 
has no business seeking to control the interjurisdictional effects of the 
judgments of its courts.89 As of 1980, a majority of the Court recognized the 
problem, although stare decisis caused them to struggle for a solution.90 
Precedent does not get in the way of clear thinking here.9 1  
The choice of the preclusive effects i n  F 1  as the measure of the federal 
obligation has an advantage that is set in relief by MortgageLinq. Under 
current law,  states in the position of F2 are required only to do what the 
courts of F 1  would do, a technique that furnishes an inner political check 
against self-regarding behavior. The court in MortgageLinq, to the contrary, 
has used (an unauthorized version of) interjurisdictional preclusion law to 
export litigation costs , laying down one rule for New Jersey and washing its 
88 .  330 U.S.  622 ( 1947) .  
89 .  Full faith and credit i s  a national policy, not a state policy . Its purpose is  not 
merely to demand respect from one state for another, but rather to give us the 
benefits of a unified nation by altering the status of otherwise "independent, 
sovereign states." Hence, it is for federal law ,  not state law , to prescribe the 
measure of credit which one state shall give to another' s  judgment. 
Willis L .M .  Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 
49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 , 16 1 -62 ( 1949) . See also A .  VoN MEHREN & D .  TRAUTMAN, supra 
note 30 ,  at 1459; Elliott E. Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 330, 338-41 ( 1944). 
90. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. ,  448 U.S. 261 ( 1980); id. at 290 
(Rehnquist, J . ,  dissenting). Professor Dane ' s  elegant commentary brings to mind a remark 
attributed to his former colleague, the late Leon Lipson: "Anything you can do, I can do 
meta." See Perry Dane, Sovereign Dignity and Glorious Chaos: A Comment on the 
lnterjurisdictional lmplications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine ,  28 RUTGERS L.J .  1 73 
( 1 996) .  But Professor Dane is admirably candid about his disagreement with the imputed 
premises, and much of the law ,  of full faith and credit. See id. at text accompanying notes 
4 ,  10 ,  3 1 .  As a result, his article also calls to mind the battles waged in Th omas and earlier 
cases for the soul of full faith and credit. Unfortunately for Professor Dane, those who 
favored the assimilation of "judicial proceedings" to "laws" for purposes of federal control 
lost the war. Fortunately for the rest of us , we do not need to suffer the costs of 
interj urisdictional "anarchy," id. text accompanying note 29, to which Professor Dane , as a 
choice of law scholar, has become accustomed. 
9 1 .  I do not regard as pertinent here the Supreme Court 's  fumbling in cases involving 
the interplay of full faith and credit and exclusive federal subject matter j urisdiction . In 
speculating about the content of "state law" on a question that a state court can never 
address , the Court has twice invoked rules or approaches that should have been irrelevant 
because they were interjurisdictional . See Matsushita Elec. Indus . Co. ,  Ltd v. Epstein ,  1 16 
S .  Ct. 873 ( 19%); Marrese v .  American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons ,  470 U.S. 373 , 
383 ( 1985) .  For discussion , see Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion ,  supra note 1 ,  at 
824-25. 
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hands of possible sequelae in other jurisdictions. So much for full faith and 
credit as a nationally unifying force.92 
Finally , those who are nonetheless attracted to the MortgageLinq 
solution because it appears functionally to respect the interests of both F l  
and F2 should reconsider. As a practical matter, the supposed benefits of 
mutual accommodation sought by the New Jersey supreme court can be 
realized, and the cost of depriving F l  of the power to control its own 
procedures discussed above can be avoided, only if there are, or are thought 
to be ,  adequate alternatives to New Jersey for subsequent litigation.93 
Passing other potential barriers to suit, there is nothing to prevent other 
states from taking the same position as F2 and thus, in theory at least, 
nothing to prevent the number of additional forums available as F2 from 
shrinking to zero.94 The content of the federal obligation should not depend 
upon such contingencies and calculations .95 
E. Relaxing the Assumptions 
1. Federal Court as Fl  
MortgageLinq in fact involved the preclusive effects to be given the 
judicial proceedings of a federal court. Although the New Jersey supreme 
court did not pause over any impact that might have on its analysis,  the 
reason may be that, in the Watkins decision on which it relied in other 
92 . Although the New Jersey supreme court does not purport to dictate a rule for 
other j urisdictions to follow, its approach might well encourage similarly self-regarding 
behavior elsewhere . See infra text accompanying note 94. 
The MortgageLinq court also exported what it claims is unfairness to parties , further 
revealing its "without prejudice" solution as a self-inflicted wound whether New Jersey is 
F2 or Fl . See infra note 152 .  
I leave to others the question raised by Professor Lilly,  "[w]hether this 'door-closing' 
posture is immune from a constitutional attack based on the argument that f-2 is  unfairly 
discriminating against f- 1 's law." Lilly, supra note 7 1 ,  at 308. 
93 . See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. Recall that the MortgageLinq court 
acknowledged that "attorneys conducting litigation in Pennsylvania courts should not have 
to accommodate their practices to the demands of New Jersey courts ." MortgageLinq, 142 
N.J.  at 345 ,  662 A .2d at 541 .  
94 . See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Again ,  I do not regard it as an adequate 
answer that the related action can be brought in Fl . See supra text accompanying notes 74-
75 .  
95 . See A .  VoN MEHREN & D .  TRAUTMAN ,  supra note 30, a t  1459 (quoted supra note 
70) . On this view, the MortgageLinq plaintiffs ' second federal lawsuit , see supra text 
accompanying notes 1 2  and 14 ,  should be dismissed on proper motion. 
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respects,96 the court had explored the question in detai l .  In any event, 
because the scholarly literature already covers the ground, we need not pause 
long over this aspect of the case. 
a. Federal Question Judgment 
The action brought in Pennsylvania federal court (F1) involved both 
state and federal claims.97 Still assuming that it went to judgment before the 
New Jersey trial court (F2) ruled on the motions to dismiss, the latter was 
not free to disregard the judgment. For, although neither Article IV of the 
Constitution nor the full  faith and credit statute applies to the judicial 
proceedings of federal courts , an obligation to respect them, equivalent in 
force and effect to full faith and credit, is found elsewhere in federal law _98 
To say that federal law requires a state court as F2 to respect federal 
judicial proceedings is not to say what law furnishes the measure of that 
respect. However, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate , 
and analysis supports the conclusion, that federal preclusion law governs the 
effects of the federal question judgment of a federal court.99 This federal law 
subsumes, to the extent that it implements , the basic federal obligation of 
respect100 and is binding on state courts under the supremacy clausel01 i n  
the sense that it preempts any inconsistent state law.  
Federal preclusion law would not have barred the plaintiffs i n  
MortgageLinq from suing the New Jersey defendants in federal court (which 
is of course precisely what they attempted to do after the trial court 
dismissed their New Jersey case) _ l02 The only justification I can imagine for 
permitting preclusion in New Jersey would be the notion that according 
greater preclusive effect evinces no disrespect of, and portends no adverse 
impact on, federal courts or the policies underlying federal law.  In other 
words,  the notion would be that barring suit against the New Jersey 
defendants in New Jersey state court would not be inconsistent with federal 
96. Watkins v. Resorts Int ' l  Hotel & Casino, Inc . ,  124 N.J. 398 , 591 A .2d 592 ( 199 1 ) .  
See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
97 . See MortgageLinq, 262 N. J. Super. 178 ,  1 82 , 620 A.2d 456, 457 .  
98 . See Burbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1 ,  at 740-47 . 
99 . See, e.g . ,  Blonder-Tongue Lab . ,  Inc .  v .  University of Ill . Found . ,  402 U.S.  3 1 3 ,  
324 n . l 2 ( 197 1 ); Stoll v .  Gottlieb, 305 U.S.  165 ( 1938); Deposit B ank v .  Frankfort, 1 9 1  
U.S .  499 ( 1903); B urbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 762-78. 
100. See B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 746. 
101 . U.S. CONST. art. VI , cl . 2.  
102. See supra text accompanying note 12 .  
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law .  The same analysis that casts doubt on that proposition for purposes of 
full faith and credit applies here.103 
b. Diversity State Law Judgment 
A more difficult problem of interjurisdictional preclusion would have 
been presented if the federal case in F l  had been a diversity state l aw action. 
Although some courts and commentators, including perhaps the New Jersey 
supreme court i n  Watkins,104 take the view that federal preclusion l aw also 
and always governs the interjurisdictional effects of a federal judgment in 
this situation, more careful analysis demonstrates that some questions are 
governed by federal , and some by state, preclusion law_ l05 
How should New Jersey as F2 treat a federal diversity judgment 
adjudicating matters of state law for purposes of party joinder and the Entire 
Controversy doctrine? In order to answer the question, it may be helpful to 
imagine-because it suggests starkly different preclusion regimes -that the 
federal court (Fl )  sits in New Jersey and that the governing substantive state 
law is New Jersey law.  On these assumptions, differences in the preclusion 
law applicable to such a case could materially affect the character or result of 
the litigation, as they could affect the choice of forum. 
If that were all ,  the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the allocation 
of federal and state lawmaking power106 would strongly suggest that state 
preclusion law (the Entire Controversy doctrine) furnished the measure of 
respect due the federal diversity judgment. 107 This law would also be 
binding on a state court as F2 under the mantle of the supremacy clause. 
103. See discussion supra parts III .C-D.  
104. See Watkins v. Resorts Int ' l  Hotel and Casino, Inc . ,  1 24 N .J .  398 , 4 1 1 ,  591 
A .2d 592 , 598 ( 1 99 1 ) ;  Degnan , supra note 82, at  755-73.  
105 . See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUIXJMENTS § 87 cmt. b ( 1 982); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CoNFUcr OF LAWS § 95 cmt. h ( 1 988 rev .) ("When a federal judgment 
adjudicates claims under State law ,  State law ,  as a matter of federal law , may determine the 
effects of the judgment."); Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 7 78-97 . 
106. See Walker v .  Armco Steel Co. ,  446 U.S.  740 ( 1 980); Hanna v .  Plumer, 380 
U.S.  460 ( 1 965).  
107 .  It is true that preclusion rules are not  made by,  and do not have their ultimate 
bite in ,  the rendering court. But in fashioning preclusion rules for federal 
judgments, federal courts are bound by federal statutes , including the Rules of 
Decision Act and federal jurisdictional statutes . The purpose of the enterprise is 
precisely to determine the law that will attend a federal diversity judgment and that 
will bind all courts , federal and state , in which the judgment is subsequently raised. 
Once that law is ascertained, it will not only furnish the rules prescribing the 
ultimate bite, but it may also affect the conduct of litigation in the rendering court. 
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There is  more, however. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not, 
and cannot validly, provide rules of preclusion, but they can validly 
influence the creation or application of federal common law . 108 It is difficult 
to make a persuasive argument for federal preclusion law on the basis of 
emanations from the Federal Rules when the question is  the joinder of 
claims, because it is difficult to tease a pertinent federal procedural policy 
from Rule 18. 109 The case for federal common law is stronger when the 
question is joinder of parties. For parties, unlike claims ,  the Federal Rules 
lay down both the maximum scope of joinder1 10 (the ceiling) and the 
minimum scope1 1 1  (the floor) . 
Particularly when juxtaposed with Rule 20 ,1 1 2 Rule 1 9  can plausibly be 
regarded as a statement of federal policy concerning the extent to which it is 
appropriate for a federal trial court to override party autonomy _ 1 1 3 If so, that 
policy would be frustrated by application of state preclusion law that more 
tightly constrained party autonomy (by requmng more expansive party 
As Professor Degnan recognized, albeit in a different context, " [i] f 'outcome 
determinative ' is the relevant test . . .  hardly anything is more dispositive than the 
doctrine of res judicata ." 
B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 785-86 (footnote omitted) . See 
also Lilly , supra note 7 1 ,  at 3 1 5 , 322 , 327 . 
1 08 .  See Burbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 772-75 , 792, 795 . 
See also Lilly ,  supra note 7 1 ,  at 320-2 1 .  
109 .  "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross­
claim,  or third-party claim may join , either as independent or as alternate claims , as many 
claims , legal , equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party." FED. R .  
Civ . P .  1 8(a) .  
'"May '  as used i n  Rule 1 8(a) does not mean 'shall . '  'Shall '  in this context i s  beyond 
the competence of the Federal Rules, and 'may ' juxtaposed with ' sh al l , '  [in Rule 1 3(a)] 
even if unauthorized, is a particularly feckless vehicle of policy ." Burbank, 
Inter jurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 792 . 
1 10 .  FED. R.  C!v. P.  20. 
1 1 1 .  FED. R .  Civ .  P .  1 9 .  
1 1 2 .  Rule 20 provides in pertinent part that: 
[a]l l  persons . . .  may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted 
against them jointly,  severally,  or in the alternative , any right to relief in respect of 
or arising out of the same transaction , occurrence , or series of transactions or 
occurrences,  and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise 
in the action . 
FED. R. C!v .  P. 20(a) . 
1 1 3 .  See FED. R. Civ .  P .  1 9; supra note 74 and accompanying text. See also Temple 
v .  Synthes Corp . ,  Ltd . ,  498 U.S . 5 ( 1990) (per curiam). "It has long been the rule that it is 
not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit . . . .  
Nothing in the 1 966 revision of Rule 1 9  changed that principle ." /d. at 7 .  
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joinder) , since the content of the governing preclusion law would affect trial 
strategy in the initial action. 1 14 Perhaps that should be sufficient reason to 
apply federal preclusion law,  or at least to preempt state law on the 
question. 1 15 
2 .  No Judgment in Fl  
When the trial court in  MortgageLinq granted the motions to dismiss 
under the Entire Controversy doctrine, the plaintiffs' federal case i n  
Pennsylvania had not yet gone to judgment. 1 16 A t  first blush, this fact may 
seem to toll the thirteenth hour on the analysis to this point, casting doubt on 
all that comes before . Even if the New Jersey supreme court reached the 
right result, however, the court made nothing of this aspect in  answering the 
first question posed, and the point is irrelevant to the second question. 1 1 7 In 
addition, it is not as clear as it may first appear to be that the pendency of the 
action in the trial court in  Fl  changes the result. It may be helpful to proceed 
by resuscitating the other assumption initially made about F l , and then 
relaxing that assumption. 
a. State Court as Fl 
Neither the full  faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the full  
faith and credit statute by its terms requires that there be a judgment in  Fl 
before the obligation it imposes on F2 attaches .  Both speak of "judicial 
proceedings."1 1 8  But the tendency to equate "judicial proceedings" and 
"judgment" is natural , if only because the protection of sister state court 
judgments was the central concern of the framers and the members of the 
first Congress. 1 19 However, that was not their only concern. 
Apart from the fact that both provisions refer to "acts" and "records ," the 
evidence from the Constitutional Convention suggests that the term "judicial 
1 14 .  For these purposes there is no need to be concerned about the locus of 
subsequent litigation , because, once determined, the governing law ,  state or federal , will be 
known in advance of the federal diversity action in F l .  Compare supra text accompanying 
notes 72-75 and 93-95 . 
1 1 5 .  Cf. Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 795 (compulsory 
counterclaims). 
1 16. See supra note 9. 
1 1 7 .  See supra text accompanying notes 15  and 22. 
1 1 8 .  Supra notes 1 7  and 1 8 .  
1 19 .  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings'' was thought to be broader than "judgment."1 20 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court recently recognized that a judgment is  the product of 
"judicial proceedings" rather than a synonym for them.1 2 1  
A literal reading of the full faith and credit statute would require F2 to 
preclude litigation that would be barred in F 1  because "judicial proceedings" 
were already pending there. For instance, if F 1  followed the domestic law 
doctrine variously known as "other action [or suit] pending" or "prior 
pending action,"1 22 this reading of the statute would make that doctrine 
binding "in every court within the United States and its Territories and 
Possessions." 1 23 
The notion may strike some as bizarre . The tradition that no bar arises 
from the pendency of identical lawsuits in state courts or in state and federal 
court suggests , if it does not require, the conclusion that there is  no federal 
full faith and credit obligation to abate the lawsuit in F2, even though it 
would be abated in F 1. 1 24 
1 20. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 ,  at 
483-89 (rev. ed. 1937); Nadelmann,  supra note 25 , at 58-59. See also Walter W .  Cook, The 
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J .  42 1 , 429 (1919) 
(arguing that "judicial proceedings" in Article IV includes original process); Edward S .  
Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 8 1  U.  PA. L. REv . 37 1 ,  3 8 8  ( 1 933) 
(assumption that "judicial proceedings" refers only to judgments seems "to be groundless") . 
1 2 1 .  "The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of a 
'judicial proceeding' within the meaning of § 1 738 . . . .  " Matsushita Elec . Indus.  Co., Ltd. 
v .  Epstein , 1 16 S. Ct. 873,  878 ( 1 996) .  
1 2 2 .  See,  e .g . ,  Sutcliffe Storage and Warehouse Co. ,  Inc. v .  United States , 1 62 F.2d 
849, 85 1 ( 1 st Cir. 1 947); Oliney v. Gardner, 771  F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1 985); Allan D .  
Vestal , Repetitive Litigation, 4 5  IowA L. REv. 525 ( 1 960). 
123.  28 U.S.C. § 1 738 ( 1996) . "[T]here are few clauses of the Constitution, the 
merely literal possibilities of which have been so little developed as the 'full faith and 
credit '  clause." Corwin , supra note 1 20,  at 388.  
1 24.  See, e .g . ,  Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v .  United States , 424 U.S.  800, 
8 1 7  ( 1 976); McClellan v. Carland , 2 1 7  U.S. 268 , 282 (19 10); E. CooPER, supra note 36, 
§ 4404, at 23 . 
But a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal 
liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing,  and an action brought 
to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the 
court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to 
proceed in its own way and in its own time without reference to the proceedings in 
the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded 
in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of 
the principles of res adjudicata by the court in which the action is still pending in 
the orderly exercise of its jurisdiction , as it would determine any other question of 
fact or law arising in the progress of the case . The rule, therefore , has become 
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joinder) , since the content of the governing preclusion law would affect trial 
strategy in the initial action. 1 14 Perhaps that should be sufficient reason to 
apply federal preclusion law,  or at least to preempt state l aw on the 
question. 1 15 
2 .  No Judgment in  Fl  
When the trial court in MortgageLinq granted the motions to dismiss 
under the Entire Controversy doctrine, the plaintiffs ' federal case in 
Pennsylvania had not yet gone to judgment_l 16 At first blush, this fact may 
seem to toll the thirteenth hour on the analysis to this point, casting doubt on 
all that comes before. Even if the New Jersey supreme court reached the 
right result, however, the court made nothing of this aspect in answering the 
first question posed, and the point is irrelevant to the second question. 1 1 7 In 
addition, it is not as clear as it  may first appear to be that the pe ndency of the 
action in  the trial court in  Fl  changes the result. It may be helpful to proceed 
by resuscitating the other assumption initially made about F l ,  and then 
relaxing that assumption. 
a. State Court as Fl  
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the full 
faith and credit statute by its terms requires that there be a judgment in  Fl  
before the obligation i t  imposes on F2 attaches .  Both speak o f  "judicial 
proceedings:• 1 1 8 But the tendency to equate "judicial proceedings" and 
"judgment" is natural , if only because the protection of sister state court 
judgments was the central concern of the framers and the members of the 
first Congress . 1 19 However, that was not their only concern. 
Apart from the fact that both provisions refer to "acts" and "records," the 
evidence from the Constitutional Convention suggests that the term "judicial 
1 14 .  For these purposes there is no need to be concerned about the locus of · 
subsequent litigation , because, once determined, the governing law, state or federal , will be 
known in advance of the federal diversity action in Fl . Compare supra tex t  accompanying 
notes 72-75 and 93-95 . 
1 15 .  Cj. B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 795 (compulsory 
counterclaims). 
1 16 . See supra note 9. 
1 1 7 .  See supra text accompanying notes 15  and 22. 
1 1 8 .  Supra notes 1 7  and 1 8 .  
1 19 .  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings" was thought to be broader than "judgment."1 20 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court recently recognized that a judgment is  the product of 
"judicial proceedings" rather than a synonym for them.1 2 1  
A literal reading of the full faith and credit statute would require F2 to 
preclude litigation that would be barred in Fl  because "judicial proceedings" 
were already pending there. For instance, if F I  followed the domestic law 
doctrine variously known as "other action [or suit] pending" or "prior 
pending action,"1 22 this reading of the statute would make that doctrine 
binding "in every court within the United States and its Territories and 
Possessions ." 1 23 
The notion may strike some as bizarre. The tradition that no bar arises 
from the pendency of identical lawsuits in state courts or in state and federal 
court suggests , if it does not require ,  the conclusion that there is  no federal 
full faith and credit obligation to abate the lawsuit in F2, even though it 
would be abated in F I . 1 24 
1 20. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 787 ,  at 
483-89 (rev . ed. 1 937); Nadelmann, supra note 25 , at 58-59. See also Walter W .  Cook, The 
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause , 28 YALE L.J .  42 1 ,  429 ( 1919) 
(arguing that "judicial proceedings" in Article IV includes original process); Edward S .  
Corwin , The "Full Faith and Credit " Clause, 8 1  U.  PA. L .  REv . 37 1 ,  388 ( 1 933) 
(assumption that "judicial proceedings" refers only to judgments seems "to be groundless") . 
1 2 1 . "The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of a 
'judicial proceeding' within the meaning of § 1 738 . . . .  " Matsushita Elec . Indus . Co. ,  Ltd. 
v. Epstein , 1 16 S. Ct. 873 , 878 ( 1996) . 
1 22 .  See, e .g . ,  Sutcliffe Storage and Warehouse Co. ,  Inc. v .  United States , 1 62 F.2d 
849, 85 1 ( 1st Cir. 1 947); Oliney v. Gardner, 771  F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1 985); Allan D .  
Vestal , Repetitive Litigation , 4 5  IOWA L. REv . 525 (1960). 
123 .  28 U.S .C.  § 1 738 ( 1 996).  "[T]here are few clauses of the Constitution, the 
merely literal possibilities of which have been so little developed as the ' full faith and 
credit '  clause ." Corwin , supra note 1 20,  at 388. 
1 24 .  See, e .g . ,  Colorado River Water Conserv . Dist. v .  United States , 424 U.S.  800, 
8 1 7  ( 1 976); McClellan v .  Carland, 2 1 7  U.S.  268 , 282 (19 10); E. CCX)FER, supra note 36, 
§ 4404, at 23 . 
But a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal 
liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought 
to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the 
court in which a prior action for the same cause is  pending. Each court is  free to 
proceed in its own way and in its own time without reference to the proceedings in 
the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded 
in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of 
the principles of res adjudicata by the court in which the action is still pending in 
the orderly exercise of its jurisdiction , as it would determine any other question of 
fact or law arising in the progress of the case . The rule, therefore , has become 
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Yet, there is nothing inevitable about this result. Indeed, some early 
cases suggested that full faith and credit might be interpreted to nationalize a 
domestic "other action pending" defense. 125 History went the other way, 126 
to the point that an amendment of the statute may be necessary to change the 
l aw.  But Congress had no problem barring duplicative simultaneous 
litigation in the child custody area, and its action in that regard may be 
further support for the proposition that at least the "judicial proceedings" 
referred to in the Constitution need not have culminated in a judgment. 1 27 
Is it necessarily true, then,  that if F l  in MortgageLinq had been a state 
court, New Jersey as F2 would not have violated federal law by barring suit 
against omitted defendants prior to judgment in Fl ? The traditional view 
regarding parallel actions in different states strongly suggests if New Jersey 
had been F 1 and no judgment had been entered, full faith and credit would 
not have required another state as F2 to abate even though the courts of New 
Jersey would do so. Are there differences between the two situations that 
might support different results under the full faith and credit statute? 
The conclusion that there is no violation of the full faith and credit 
statute if F2 entertains litigation that would be barred in F l  because of 
another action pending can usually be justified by reference to the rules and 
policies of domestic preclusion law. 128 Pendency of the action i n  Fl usually 
generally established that where the action first brought is  in personam and seeks 
only a personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another j urisdiction 
is  not precluded. 
Kline v .  B urke Constr. Co. ,  260 U.S.  226, 230 ( 1 922) . 
30. 
1 25 .  See, e .g . ,  Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn.  1 54 ( 1 8 14); Vestal , supra note 122 ,  at 528-
1 26. See, e .g . ,  Stanton v .  Embrey, 93 U.S.  548 , 554 ( 1 877) . 
127 .  A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody 
determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of 
another State where such court of that other State is exercising j urisdiction 
consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination . 
28 U.S .C. § 1 738A(g) ( 1 996) .  
Although this is  not a necessary inference (because the statute can be j ustified o n  other 
grounds) , it is evidence against the assertion that "[t]he essential characteristic of 'judicial 
proceedings ' within the meaning of the full faith and credit clause is the property of being 
res judicata ." Albert S .  Abel , Administrative Determinations and Full Faith and Credit, 22 
IOWA L .  REv. 461 ,  5 16 ( 1937). In any event, the author's  assertion i s  unsupported by 
reasoning and appears a transparent attempt to ease the way for full faith and credit to 
administrative determinations .  
128 .  That is not because preclusion i s  the central federal policy; it is  rather the area 
of concern that led to Article IV and the implementing statute, which have a broader policy. 
See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. 
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signifies that no domestic rule of preclusion is applicable,  which in tum 
means that i n  Fl the policies of finality, repose and reliance are not 
sufficiently implicated to require protection. 129 
To be sure, a domestic "other action pending" or "prior pending action" 
defense can be thought to protect some of the same interests , in particular the 
interest of litigants in freedom from harassment. To the extent, however, that 
such a defense is designed to protect F l  's judicial resources ,  they require no 
protection if F2 is a court in another state or a federal court. Moreover, there 
are other interests , including those of F2 ,  at stake. 
It would not be irrational for Congress to conclude that duplicative 
litigation is a sufficiently serious national problem to warrant overriding the 
interests at stake in the litigation in F2 prior to judgment in F l  (at least if Fl  
would then bar such litigation) . But keeping in mind the problems that 
brought forth the constitutional provision, neither was it irrational for courts 
to fail to impute that interpretation to its implementing statute. 
A judgment is not, however, an infallible marker for the existence of full 
faith and credit concerns. It is not even a reliable prerequisite for preclusion 
in domestic law. 
The first test of the proposition that there can be no violation of the full 
faith and credit statute unless there is a judgment in Fl comes as a result of 
developments in modem issue preclusion law. There is authority for the rule 
that in some circumstances a finding can be given preclusive effect before 
there is a judgment. This approach gives finality a different meaning for 
issue preclusion purposes than it has for claim preclusion purposes. 1 30 If Fl 
has adopted this rule, surely it  is too facile to let F2 off the hook by insisting 
that "judicial proceedings" means "judgment." 1 3 1  For, here both the 
domestic preclusion law of Fl and the broader full faith and credit policy of 
unifying the country support requiring F2 to follow FI ) 32 
1 29.  "Judicial actions must achieve a basic minimum quality to become eligible for 
res judicata effects . The traditional words used to describe this quality require that there be 
a judgment that is valid, final, and on the merits." E .  COOPER , supra note 36, § 4427 , at 269. 
1 30. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co . ,  297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 
1 96 1 ) ,  cert. denied, 368 U.S.  986 ( 1 962); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 3  
( 1982). 
1 3 1 .  But see E. CooPER, supra note 36 , § 4467 , at 643. "More conservative courts 
should be free to litigate the same issues- here , if nowhere else , it seems clear that there is 
not yet any judgment, and the vague full fai th and credit terminology of 'judicial 
proceedings ' should not be expanded beyond judgments at this late date." /d. 
1 32 . See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. To the extent that according such 
preclusive effect were discretionary in Fl , F2 would have the same discretion . 
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Attention to this broader policy suggests that there may be a relevant 
difference between my hypothetical variant of MortgageLinq and the case i n  
which New Jersey is F l -the second test of the proposition. I n  the l atter 
case, where it appears clear that another state's  courts or a federal court 
would not be required to preclude, although New Jersey courts would 
preclude, prior to judgment, 1 33 the interests of New Jersey are captured i n  
the policies that it has imputed to the Entire Controversy doctrine. To the 
extent that they are the policies of preclusion law,  as discussed above, prior 
to judgment in New Jersey, they are not implicated to the degree necessary 
to require other states or the federal courts to surrender whatever interests 
may be at stake in the litigation filed there. Moreover, New Jersey's  interest 
in protecting its judicial resources does not in this situation require federal 
protection. 1 34 Finally , there is  little risk that the failure to require F2 to 
preclude prior to judgment will deprive New Jersey as F l  of the ability to 
control its own procedures. The fact that full faith and credit does require 
preclusion in F2 after judgment in F l 1 35 should prevent litigants from 
gambling on a rush to judgment in F2 by ignoring the Entire Controversy 
doctrine in F l .  
When New Jersey is F2 the absence of a judgment i n  F l  does not 
eliminate the impact F2's  application of the Entire Controversy doctrine may 
have, in future cases,  on F l .  The relevant decisions regarding litigation 
strategy in F l  will have been made long before the case is over, and the 
plaintiff may not be able to wait until the case is over to file i n  F2. If one 
believes that permitting New Jersey to apply the Entire Controversy doctrine 
as F2 would violate full faith and credit when there is a judgment in F l ,  1 36 it 
is hard to defend a contrary result when there is not. 
Reliance on tradition usually justifies the equation of "judicial 
proceedings" and "judgment." But there is no tradition on the duty of F2 to 
follow the latest development in Fl  ' s  domestic preclusion l aw ,  and the 
tradition on the question of greater preclusive effect does not require the 
existence of a judgment in F l  for its intellectual support. 1 37 Perhaps for such 
cases we ought to read the statute literally in light of its dominant purpose. If 
we do that, New Jersey would violate full  faith and credit by applying the 
1 33 .  Here I am disregarding New Jersey's attempt to deprive judgments enforcing 
its Entire Controversy doctrine of extra-territorial effect. See supra text accompanying 
notes 75-94; infra text accompanying note 146. 
1 34 .  See supra text accompanying note 129. 
1 35 .  See infra text accompanying note 1 50. 
1 36 .  See discussion supra parts III .C-D. 
1 37 .  See discussion supra part III . C .  
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Entire Controversy doctrine to preclude suit against parties omitted i n  an 
action in F 1  even before that action went to judgment. 
b. Federal Court as F 1  
Finally, we reach the case that was before the New Jersey supreme court 
in MortgageLinq. For these purposes we need not be concerned about the 
traditional interpretation of the full faith and credit statute , or about that 
statute at all .  On the other hand, alternative explanations of the source of the 
obligation to respect federal judicial proceedings or of the law that governs 
the preclusive effects thereof do not provide nourishment if they must 
assume the existence of a judgment. Not all of them must do so. 
Federal common law is the source of the obligation to respect federal 
judgments , as it is likely to be the source of any federal rule of preclusion 
defining the measure of respect that they are due_ l38 The existence of 
pertinent and valid federal common law obviously does not depend generally 
on the existence of a federal judgment.1 39 Moreover, preemptive federal law, 
which is a subset of federal common law, 140 is as legitimate when necessary 
to protect federal procedural interests as it is when necessary to protect 
federal substantive interests_ 141  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not statutes, and mischief can 
follow from the assumption that they are . l42 The Federal Rules are, 
however, provided for by a federal statute143 and should be treated as if they 
were statutes for the purpose of considering whether they justify the creation 
(or application) of federal common law _144 
1 38 .  See supra text accompanying notes 97- 10 1 .  
1 39. See B urbank,  Inter jurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 753-62, 783-9 1 .  
140. See Thomas W .  Merrill ,  The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. 
Cm. L .  RE v .  1 ,  32-39 ( 1985); Burbank , /nterjurisdictional Preclusion ,  supra note 1 ,  at  808 
n .360. 
14 1 .  See, e .g . ,  Tullock v .  Mulvane, 1 84 U.S.  497 , 5 12-13 ( 1902). 
142 .  See Stephen B .  Burbank, The Rule Enabling Act of 1934 , 1 30 U .  PA . L .  REv . 
10 15 , 1 102, 1 1 77-78 ( 1982) . 
143. See 28. U . S.C . § §  2072-74 ( 1994). 
144. See supra text accompanying note 107 .  "Even when legal regulation in a certain 
area is forbidden to the [Federal] Rules,  the policies underlying valid Rules may help to 
shape valid federal common law." B urbank, Inter jurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 ,  at 
774 (footnote omitted). 
To hold the contrary . . .  would be but to declare that although the power conferred 
by Congress upon this Court to adopt equity rules is controlling , nevertheless the 
interpretations of the rules and the limitations which arise from a proper 
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If the application of the Entire Controversy doctrine by New Jersey as 
F2 would frustrate Fl  ' s  policy on party autonomy as reflected i n  Rule 1 9 ,  
thereby depriving the federal court of the power to control its own 
procedures , 145 that effect would occur long before there was a judgment i n  
federal court. Moreover, the impact of the holding in MortgageLinq that a 
dismissal in New Jersey is "without prejudice" would be no different i n  this 
situation than it would be if there were a judgment in Fl . Here too one can 
imagine contingencies that would require the federal courts to sacrifice their 
own,  and to bear the costs of New Jersey's  procedural policies . l46 
One response to this line of reasoning might be that, if federal law 
indeed governs the preclusive effects of a federal judgment on the question 
involved in MortgageLinq, the plaintiff can avoid any difficulty simply by 
waiting to file suit in New Jersey . But, as a result of a l ooming limitations 
bar or other reasons , that may be a matter beyond the plaintiff' s control. 
Remembering the law that governs once there is a judgment is useful , 
however, since we can now see that permitting New Jersey to apply the 
Entire Controversy doctrine before judgment would undermine not only 
Rule 1 9  but federal judge-made preclusion law as well .  
The displacement or preemption of state law in order to protect federal 
interests usually occurs in the proceeding, federal or state , i n  which that 
interest is directly involved. But there is no requirement to that effect, as the 
process of determining the law that governs the preclusive effects of federal 
judgments itself demonstrates . l47 The real question here , as when 
assumptions were made in order to ease the way for full  faith and credit 
analysis ,  is whether the federal interests are sufficiently important, and the 
threat to those interests sufficiently plausible, to justify the displacement of 
state law. 
IV. NEW JERSEY AS THE FIRST FORUM (Fl )  
A consideration of the questions asked and answered by the court i n  
MortgageLinq has already entai led some attention to the status of New 
Jersey as FI . 148 It may be useful to bring together prior analysis that bears 
construction of them, as expounded by this court and enunciated i n  its decisions ,  
are without avai l .  
Tullock v .  Mulvane,  1 84 U.S.  497 , 5 1 3  ( 1902). 
145 . See supra text accompanying notes 96- 1 15 .  
146. See supra text accompanying notes 76-95 . 
147 .  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
148 .  See, e .g . ,  supra text accompanying note 82. 
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on this situation and to complete the picture by sketching i n  a few missing 
details.  
A. New Jersey State Court 
New Jersey enforces its views concerning the mandatory joinder of 
parties through something called •<the Entire Controversy doctrine," not .. res 
judicata" or .. preclusion," and the effect of its application is  far beyond 
anything known to preclusion law in 1790. Neither the label used nor the 
fact that in this application the doctrine is a modem development suffices to 
negate the obligations otherwise imposed by the full  faith and credit clause 
and its implementing statute. In that regard , it bears emphasis that the New 
Jersey courts have treated this aspect of the doctrine as functionally related 
to, and a logical outgrowth of, the doctrine as applied to claims and have 
justified both according to the conventional goals of preclusion law. 
Moreover, the effect of precluding suit against persons not joined as required 
by the doctrine is to preclude a plaintiff's claims against those persons . 149 
Similarly,  there is no basis in the statute, the cases interpreting it, or 
contemporary attitudes towards preclusion, to except from the federal 
obligation rules of F1 that are deemed to be outside the ··central core" 
because not sufficiently related to the supposed central values of preclusion. 
In any event, such analysis could not stand alone because it fails to reflect 
the central policy of full  faith and credit-the unification of the country 
through respect for the judicial proceedings of Fl . 150 
Thus, even if New Jersey's (Fl 's) Entire Controversy doctrine as applied 
to parties were thought to fall outside the ··central core ," F2 should not be 
permitted to disregard the doctrine in subsequent litigation there , because to 
do so would deprive New Jersey of the power to control its own procedures. 
New Jersey's different view of party autonomy and of the putatively most 
efficient litigation package is entitled to protection. 
1 49. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35 . Professor Dane's  characterization of 
the Entire Controversy doctrine as penalizing party behavior may not be a "subterfuge," 
Dane, supra note 90, at 1 86, but neither does it suffice to disengage the doctrine from its 
oft-proclaimed domestic law roots in preclusion law or from the interjurisdictional 
consequences that those roots entail . Claim preclusion , which after all is a subset of the 
same doctrine, can be explained in similar terms . Moreover, it is precisely because the 
MortgageLinq court 's "without prejudice" solution is so obviously self-defeating from the 
perspective of fairness to parties ,  see supra note 92 and infra note 152 ,  that the perspective 
itself seems , if not a "subterfuge," then an after-thought .  
1 50 .  See supra text accompanying notes 36-55 .  
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The rule announced in MortgageLinq that entire controversy dismissals 
are .. without prejudice" interjurisdictionally was apparently i ntended to 
apply when New Jersey is F l  as well as when it is F2. 1 5 1  It is not, I have 
argued, a rule that New Jersey is empowered to mak:e. 152 If so, it is also not 
a rule that courts of other states or federal courts (F2) are empowered to 
follow. Precisely because the rule would have most of its bite i n  cases in 
which New Jersey was F l , as announced in MortgageLinq it would appear 
to be a violation not just of the state's  obligations as F2, but also of its 
obligations as F l .  
Perhaps , however, this situation should be distinguished by analogy to 
the traditional full faith and credit treatment of statute of limitations 
dismissals .  A plaintiff whose suit in F l  is dismissed on limitations grounds 
and who is barred from suing again on the same claim in F l  is nevertheless 
usually free to sue in any other jurisdiction whose limitations l aw will 
permit it. 153 Are there reasons why the Entire Controversy doctrine should 
be treated differently (when New Jersey is F l )?1 54 
The special treatment of limitations dismissals is the product of the 
traditional , largely discredited choice of law approach to limitations _ l 55 For 
that reason alone, it is not a good candidate for extension into other areas . 1 56 
1 5 1 .  See supra text accompanying note 82. 
152 .  See supra text accompanying notes 87-95 . From the perspective of fairness to 
parties , it is also a self-inflicted wound, leaving the objects of the state ' s  concern subject to 
suit in other jurisdictions . See supra note 92, 149. 
1 53 . See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCf OF LAWS § 1 10 cmts . a & b ( 1 988 
rev .) ;  REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19  cmt . f, reporter's note ( 1 982). 
1 54 .  Any attempt to use the analogy to salvage such treatment of a dismissal by New 
Jersey as F2, which I have analyzed separately ,  see supra text accompanying notes 76-95 , 
encounters additional objections .  The limitations rule does not pose for litigants the 
problems of predictability that the New Jersey scheme entails ,  even if dismissal is  "without 
prejudice ," and does not deprive F1 of the power to control its own procedures .  
155 .  See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCf OF LAWS § 142 ( 1988 rev .) .  "We think 
that the statute of limitations should be dealt with in much the same way as any other 
choice of law problem, and that we should no longer be bound by the notion that it is  
procedural ." 65 A .L.I .  PROC. 322 ( 1988) . 
Professor Dane regards the modern choice of law approach to statutes of limitations,  
which is  favored by the American Law Institute, as "reductive and doctrinaire and 
unnecessary." Dane, supra note 90, at 1 88 .  I am honored. Cf. American Nat ' l  Red Cross v .  
S .G . ,  505 U.S. 247 , 256 n.7 ( 1992). 
1 56 .  It "represents but a reflex of the traditional , monolithic approach to statutes of 
limitations and is  hardly good authority." Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion,  supra 
note 1 ,  at 797 n . 3 17 .  See infra note 1 60 .  Note, however, that the American Law Institute 
made changes in section 1 10 of the Restatement only to the extent necessary to reflect 
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Also, any attempt categorically or functionally to exempt from the obligation 
of full faith and credit adjudications based on Fl 's "procedural" rules would 
quickly run up against the reality that preclusion law is to a great extent a 
reflection of procedure, 157 as well as the important role that the federal 
obligation plays in enabling F l  to control its own procedures. 1 5 8  
I f  the supposed analogy preserved the New Jersey scheme from a full 
faith and credit violation, there would be no apparent basis on which to 
distinguish dismissals for failure to join claims, to which that scheme seems 
also intended to apply_ l59 For that matter, what basis would there be to 
distinguish the decision by any state to make dismissals under any aspect of 
its domestic preclusion law "with prejudice" internally but "without 
prejudice" extemally?160 What then would remain of the underlying federal 
changes made to section 142. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 10 
reporter' s  note ( 1988 rev.) .  See also infra note 160. 
157 . See, e.g . ,  Williamson v .  Columbia Gas & Elec . Corp . ,  1 86 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d 
Cir. 1950) , cert . denied, 341 U.S.  921 ( 195 1 ) .  
In holding that full faith and credit did not require a federal court to give effect to the 
rendering state ' s  compulsory counterclaim rule, a panel of the Fifth Circuit distinguished 
between the purposes of "essentially procedural res judicata rules" animated by an "interest 
in judicial economy" that is "local in scope," and "the national interest in avoiding 
relitigation of adjudicated issues." Chapman v. Aetna Finance Co. ,  615 F.2d 361 ,  363 (5th 
Cir. 1 980) .  The distinction would exempt from the federal obligation a good deal of modem 
claim preclusion law, which is reason enough to reject it. See also Virginia-Carolina Chern. 
Co. v. Kirven , 2 15 U.S.  252, 260 ( 1909) (conclusion that federal judgment not res judicata 
impossible if state code of procedure, applicable in the federal action , in fact required 
defendant "to set up his demand for damages [counterclaim] in the answer'') . 
I have previously argued that "[i] n recognizing the interdependence of procedure and 
substance . . .  it is not necessary , although it may be convenient, to reject the utility of any 
attempt to develop rules or standards for court rulemaking purposes ." B urbank, supra note 
142, at 1 1 88 .  I am, therefore , sympathetic to Professor Dane ' s  attempt to draw lines 
between procedure and substance . See Dane, supra note 90, at text accompanying notes 22-
23 , 44-46. To avoid the costs of essentialism, however, one must keep in mind the purpose 
of the line-drawing exercise. 
Law reformers have long assured us that procedure is technical , details - in short, 
adjective law. Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to other matters, only in 
Wonderland do they describe rules of preclusion . 
Stephen B .  B urbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on 
Marrese, 70 CoRNELL . REv. 659, 662 ( 1985) (footnote omitted) .  
1 58 .  See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
1 59. See supra text accompanying note 82 and note 149. 
160 . It is not clear how far the principle underlying the effect of dismissals based on 
the statute of limitations does or should extend. Should it extend, for example, to a 
dismissal based on the statute of frauds if the second jurisdiction has a different 
statute that would lead to a different result? Neither authority nor policy lends firm 
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policy? 'The force of [full faith and credit] is not so weak that it can be 
evaded by mere mention of the word[s] [without prejudice] ."1 6 1  Otherwise, 
"States would . . . be free to nullify for their own people the legislative 
decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the People."1 62 
Accordingly, when defendants are omitted from litigation i n  New Jersey 
state court in violation of the Entire Controversy doctrine, once that 
litigation comes to judgment, the courts of every other state and the federal 
courts are obligated to preclude another lawsuit to the same extent that it 
would be precluded in New Jersey. With one exception, however, the 
obligation does not arise prior to judgment in F1 , even though a subsequent 
suit in New Jersey would then be precluded. l63 The courts of F2 are free to 
preclude if authorized by domestic law, but federal law does not require 
them to do so_ l64 
The exception arises in state law diversity actions in federal court in 
New Jersey commenced after a state court action to which New Jersey' s  
party joinder rule applies . It would materially affect the character or result of 
such actions if the federal court were free to entertain a case that would be 
barred in New Jersey state court and the difference would also affect the 
choice of forum. The policies animating Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not require protection in this situation, as they arguably 
do when the first action is filed in federal court, and there is no other 
plausible basis for the federal court to refuse to apply state law _ 1 65 
support to nonpreclusion in such a case. Indeed, nonpreclusion seems questionable 
even with respect to the statute of limitation s .  
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19  cmt. f, reporter's note ( 1982) .  
Professor Dane assures us  that h is  argument relying on  the issue preclusive , but  not 
claim preclusive , nature of "non-merits dismissals," Dane , supra note 90, at 1 90, "is not 
just an academic gloss" nor "mere trickery or sleight of hand." !d. Perhaps not, but the 
argument does not address the evident incompatibility with the purposes of full faith and 
credit of permitting New Jersey to distinguish between merits and non-merits dismissals 
according to its view of interjurisdictional , as opposed to domestic , needs .  See supra text 
accompanying note 92. 
161 . Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S .  356, 382-83 ( 1990) (supremacy clause) . 
162 .  !d. at 383 . 
163 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 33-35 . 
164 .  " A  state court , i n  conformity to state policy,  may, by comity , give a remedy 
which the full faith and credit clause does not compel." Milwaukee County v .  M .  E. White 
Co. ,  296 U.S.  268 , 272 ( 1935). 
165 .  See supra text accompanying notes 104- 1 15 .  Cf. Seaboard Finance Co. v.  
Davis , 276 F. Supp. 507 (N.D.  I l l .  1967) (federal diversity court as F2 must apply Illinois 
prior pending action statute when Il linois state courts would do so, here because of case 
pending in California as F1 ) .  Compare supra note 82 (judgment) . 
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B.  New Jersey Federal Court 
Consideration of New Jersey's obligations as F2 required attention to 
situations in which Fl  was a federal court. That analysis supports the 
conclusion that federal law governs the preclusive effects of the federal 
question judgment of a federal court, and it makes no difference where that 
federal court sits . 166 The same conclusion was suggested for a state law 
diversity judgment, where the situation chosen for the analysis envisioned 
F l  as a federal court sitting in New Jersey applying New Jersey substantive 
law.  The conclusion is ,  however, not as firm and requires a sensitive 
appreciation of the interplay between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and federal common law. 167 
Finally, if the initial federal action in MortgageLinq had been brought in 
New Jersey, the question presented would have been whether New Jersey 
could preclude a subsequent state court action prior to judgment in F l .  
Consideration of the federal court's procedural interests , reflected in Rule 
19 ,  suggests that, even before judgment, federal common la\\: would preempt 
the application of the Entire Controversy doctrine. If so, it would make no 
difference whether the federal court action had been brought to adjudicate a 
federal question or in diversity to adjudicate state law claims . 168 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Entire Controversy doctrine may be unique to New Jersey , but it 
furnishes a fertile field in which to cultivate questions , the answers to which 
are of significance far beyond its borders . 
Perhaps the most interesting of those questions relates to the supposed 
equivalence of .. judicial proceedings" and judgments for purposes of the full 
faith and credit statute. I have suggested that the equivalence is not 
complete, that in some circumstances where there has not yet been a 
judgment in Fl , the statute obligates F2 to act as F l  would. In other words, I 
have suggested that the court in MortgageLinq was wrong on the facts of the 
case, as well as on assumptions relating to distinctions it deemed irrelevant. 
Note that a federal diversity court in New Jersey, sitting as F2, would also be required 
to apply the Entire Controversy doctrine after judgment in F1 if full faith and credit 
permitted New Jersey to, and it would, do so (i .e. ,  give greater preclusive effect) . 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 96- 103. 
167 .  See supra text accompanying notes 104-15 . 
168 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 38-47 . 
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But the matter deserves, and I hope to give it, more intensive historical and 
analytical attention. 
